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Summary and Keywords
Adaptation to climate change is not only a technical issue; above all, it is a matter of 
governance. Governance is more than government and includes the totality of 
interactions in which public as well as private actors participate, aiming to solve societal 
problems. Adaptation governance poses some specific, demanding challenges, such as the 
context of institutional fragmentation, as climate change involves almost all policy 
domains and governance levels; the persistent uncertainties about the nature and scale of 
risks and proposed solutions; and the need to make short-term policies based on long-
term projections. Furthermore, adaptation is an emerging policy field with, at least for 
the time being, only weakly defined ambitions, responsibilities, procedures, routines, and 
solutions. Many scholars have already shown that complex problems, such as adaptation 
to climate change, cannot be solved in a straightforward way with actions taken by a 
hierarchic or monocentric form of governance. This raises the question of how to develop 
governance arrangements that contribute to realizing adaptation options and increasing 
the adaptive capacity of society. A series of seven basic elements have to be addressed in 
designing climate adaptation governance arrangements: the framing of the problem, the 
level(s) at which to act, the alignment across sectoral boundaries, the timing of the 
policies, the selection of policy instruments, the organization of the science-policy 
interface, and the most appropriate form of leadership. For each of these elements, this 
chapter suggests some tentative design principles. In addition to effectiveness and 
legitimacy, resilience is an important criterion for evaluating these arrangements. The 
development of governance arrangements is always context- and time-specific, and 
constrained by the formal and informal rules of existing institutions.
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Introduction
This introduction section discusses the concept of adaptation to climate change and its 
increasing prominence on policy agendas across the globe. It argues that adaptation is 
not only a technical issue, but a governance issue, resulting in a huge growth of climate 
adaptation governance publications.
Global climate change is expected to increasingly lead to changes in weather conditions 
for decades to come and to seriously impact people, economic sectors, and regions 
throughout the world (Rockström et al., 2009; Field et al., 2014). Many of these impacts are 
visible already, such as increasing temperatures, rising sea levels, melting of glaciers, 
increasing drought, expansion of dry areas, and more frequent extreme weather (IPCC, 
2014). Even if mitigation efforts are successful and greenhouse gas emissions are 
stabilized or radically reduced, harmful effects will continue to occur (Ford et al., 2013). 
The recognition of these risks results in a demand for adaptation: coping strategies to 
avoid, recover from, or benefit from these climate impacts (Biagini et al., 2014). Adaptation 
has become a core element of climate research and figures prominently in many policies, 
varying from the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) to the Delhi climate change action plan 
(Hughes, 2013). The initial fear that adaptation would diminish the urgency for mitigation 
has receded because, amongst other things, reducing the rate as well as the magnitude of 
global warming may increase the time available for adaptation (Pielke et al., 2007). 
However, the opportunities to take advantage of positive synergies between adaptation 
and mitigation may decrease with time (IPCC, 2014; Dow et al., 2013).
Adaptation to climate change is a complicated concept, with various meanings (Bassett & 
Fogelman, 2013; Biagini et al., 2014; Dupuis & Knoepfel, 2013; Eriksen et al., 2015). Most 
scholars follow the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which initially 
defined adaptation as adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities (IPCC, 2001). In later reports, the IPCC emphasized that adaptation goes 
beyond infrastructural and technical adjustments only, and also involves enhancing the 
adaptive capacity of society to deal with unexpected and unpredictable future changes 
and vulnerabilities (IPCC, 2007). More recently and against the backdrop of discussions on 
adapting to temperatures of 4°C and beyond, transformational change has been 
introduced as an additional and necessary response, in particular in situations where the 
rate or extent of (projected) climate change may cause incremental forms of adaptation to 
be insufficient (Folke et al., 2010; Kates et al., 2012; Pelling et al., 2014; IPCC, 2012). 
Adaptation thus can consist of anything between incremental coping strategies and 
paradigmatic change, low-cost adjustments and expensive infrastructural investments, 
precautionary measures and end of pipe evacuation plans, and small experiments and 
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large-scale forms of capacity building (Biagini et al., 2014; Kates et al., 2012; Lesnikowski et 
al., 2015; Termeer, Dewulf, & Biesbroek, 2016).
Although a great deal of this adaptation will result from autonomous (spontaneous) or 
self-governing actions of private actors, many aspects of adaptation will require collective 
action (Jordan & Huitema, 2014; Mees et al., 2016). Dealing with adaptation is thus not only 
a technical issue, but above all a demanding matter of governance (Adger et al., 2009). 
Climate adaptation presents huge challenges to politicians and policymakers charged 
with the task of creating ways to avoid serious damage and harm for their citizens 
(Huitema et al., 2016; Suykens et al., 2016). Many scholars have convincingly shown that 
complex climate problems cannot be solved in a straightforward way, with actions taken 
by governmental actors in a hierarchic or monocentric way (Duit & Galaz, 2008; Ostrom, 
2010). It is an illusion that top-down steering by governments and intergovernmental 
organizations alone can address global problems (Hajer et al., 2015). Governing complex 
climate adaptation issues also means adopting a realist perspective, in which governance 
is considered a fragile activity, with labyrinths of struggles, with setbacks, reversals, and 
miscommunications, and with disagreements and power plays between interdependent 
actors (Biesbroek et al., 2014; Eriksen et al., 2015). This differs from the dominant portrayal 
of adaptation governance by both researchers and policymakers as “the purposeful 
efforts of selecting the best options to solve the problem of climate change impacts as 
effectively and efficiently as possible” (Biesbroek et al., 2014, p. 2).
Whereas mitigation is a firmly entrenched field of governance, adaptation to climate 
change is a relatively new topic on policy agendas throughout the world (Huitema et al., 
2016). In the academic field, there has been a growth in the number of publications on the 
governance of adaptation to climate change. This literature deals with many topics, 
including, but not limited to, policy innovation (Jordan & Huitema, 2014), policy diffusion 
(Hakelberg, 2014), barriers to adaptation (Biesbroek et al., 2014; Dow et al., 2013; Eisenack 
et al., 2014), social contracts (Adger et al., 2009), adaptive capacity (Gupta et al., 2010; 
O’Brien, 2012; Pahl-Wostl, 2009), building of resilience (Olsson et al., 2014; Pelling et al., 2014; 
Tompkins & Adger, 2004), legal issues (Green et al., 2013), communication (Dessai et al., 
2007; Moser, 2016), financing (Biagini et al., 2014), and evaluation and assessments (Doria et 
al., 2009; Haug et al., 2010; Lesnikowski et al., 2015).
Much of this literature is rather anecdotal, reflects poor relationships between theories 
and activities on the ground, and is difficult to translate into practical recommendations 
(Biagini et al., 2014). Meanwhile, governing climate adaptation requires governance actors 
to develop appropriate governance arrangements. This requires difficult choices to be 
made about: the framing of the problem; the level(s) at which to act; the alignment across 
sectoral boundaries; the timing of the policies; the selection of policy instruments; the 
organization of the science-policy interface; and the most appropriate form of leadership 
(Huitema et al., 2016). In addition to effectiveness and legitimacy, resilience is an 
important criterion to guide the development and evaluation of governance arrangements 
(Termeer et al., 2011). Arrangements are legitimate if they ensure transparency, 
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accountability, fairness, and equity. Effectiveness means that they address the adaptation 
task decisively and efficiently through the right mix of strategies and tools. Resilience 
means that the governance arrangement itself is able to adapt to changing physical, 
socioeconomic, and political circumstances without losing its reliability. This chapter aims 
to identify design principles that take the particular complexities of climate adaptation 
into account, start from a realist perspective on governance, and elaborate on the various 
theoretical insights. The style of this chapter is theoretical and exploratory; however, to 
support and illustrate the argument, some examples of climate adaptation in the 
Netherlands, Germany, and the European Union (EU) are added.
General and Specific Features of the 
Governance of Climate Adaptation
This section addresses the question if the governance of climate adaption is new and thus 
requires new knowledge, or if it can elaborate on knowledge from other policy fields with 
similar governance challenges. It argues that climate adaptation does indeed show many 
general features of wicked problems and that the discourse is part of a broader 
governance research. In addition, adaptation to climate change poses four more some 
specific features, resulting in particularly demanding governing challenges.
General Features of Wicked Problems
Because climate change exhibits many features of wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 
1973), it has been called a wicked problem par excellence (Jordan et al., 2010; Termeer et 
al., 2013). Wicked problems are hard to pin down because “the formulation of a wicked 
problem is the problem” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 161). Disagreement on both goals and 
facts makes climate adaptation prone to controversies that inevitably result in power 
plays, as stakes are high (Hoppe, 2010). Because of their multi-dimensional and 
interconnected characteristics, “every wicked problem can be considered to be a 
symptom of another problem” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 162). Adaptation measures can 
have unpredictable consequences because of the inherently incomplete understanding of 
problems, so that today’s solution can become tomorrow’s problems. Finally, wicked 
problems have no “stopping rule” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 162). The problem of 
adaptation to climate change can never be resolved definitively, and actors can always try 
to do better. Because the benefits of adaptation can take a considerable amount of time to 
become evident, it is also very hard for actors to assess how much adaptation is good 
enough. What is more, adaptation strategies can result in unintended dynamics in other 
places, often triggering new problems.
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Governance of adaptation thus faces all the usual difficulties, hindrances, and 
opportunities involved in dealing with wicked problems. Consequently, adaption 
governance can elaborate on emerging discourses and insights on the governance of 
wicked problems in general. In addition, climate adaptation poses some specific 
interrelated complexities: an emerging policy domain, fragmentation, deep uncertainties, 
and a long-term horizon (Davoudi et al., 2009; Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2016; Jordan 
et al., 2010; Termeer et al., 2011).
Specific Feature One: An Emerging Policy Domain
Since the beginning of this century, the need for climate change adaptation has been 
debated at various national and international policy venues (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; 
Biagini et al., 2014; Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). In 2005, Finland was the first country in the 
world to develop a comprehensive national adaptation strategy (Biesbroek et al., 2010). In 
comparison to many other policies, adaptation is a rather young and emerging policy field 
with, at least for the time being, only weakly defined ambitions, responsibilities, 
procedures, routines, solutions, and evaluation methods (Haug et al., 2010). The lack of a 
well-institutionalized policy domain creates both advantages and hindrances. Within this 
institutional void, policymakers have the opportunity to make certain basic choices 
(Huitema et al., 2016; Massey et al., 2015, Jordan et al., 2010). Which agency should be given 
the responsibility for climate adaptation policy? How should necessary behavioral change 
be enhanced? Do we need national, international, or locally formulated adaptation 
strategies, or all of these? However, these choices do not take place in an institutional 
vacuum. In general, most conventional governance institutions are poorly equipped to 
enable, or at least tolerate, new policy strategies (Head & Alford, 2015; Hendriks & Grin, 
2007). This chapter assumes that this is especially true in the case of climate adaptation, 
because most governance institutions date back to a time when the climate issue was of 
hardly any importance (Gupta et al., 2010). New governance arrangements will inevitably 
face tensions with the formal and informal rules of existing institutions, protected by 
historically grown power relations (Driessen & van Rijswick, 2011).
Specific Feature Two: Fragmented Governance System
Most governance systems are characterized by their polycentric nature; this refers to the 
fact that they consist of many centers of decision making that are formally independent of 
one another, make their own decisions, but do engage in mutual adjustment (Ostrom, 
2010). Fragmentation arises because public and private agencies have developed various 
ways of managing collective goods at multiple scales (Ostrom, 2010). Because climate 
change potentially impacts upon a variety of physical and social systems that are heavily 
interconnected, the governance systems that deal with the consequences of climate 
change are possibly even more fragmented than their counterparts in other policy 
domains (Termeer et al., 2011). Climate adaptation governance affects many different 
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domains as varied as water management, infrastructure, forestry, energy supply, spatial 
planning, tourism, agriculture, nature conservation, health, industry, and other economic 
activities. These domains all relate to different jurisdictional levels, policy sectors, and 
societal systems, which have particular interests, ways of addressing problems, and 
historically grown networks (May et al., 2006). Furthermore, both climate change impacts 
and adaptation policies trigger new interdependencies among these domains. For 
example, if a changing local climate pushes certain species to new territories, regional 
water management and national nature conservation policies may all be significantly 
affected. In turn, policies to tackle heat stress in cities may induce new linkages with 
urban planning and urban healthcare (Uittenbroek, 2014). A confounding complexity is 
that climate vulnerabilities are often not easily separable from economic or social 
vulnerabilities, and therefore need to be linked to other such domains (Tompkins & 
Adger, 2004). The resulting institutional fragmentation is too readily perceived as a 
negative context that hinders and delays concerted collective action (Edelenbos & Van 
Meerkerk, 2015; Ostrom, 2010). The key argument of authors who perceive fragmentation as 
negative is that fragmented governance structures will never be able to provide the 
capacity required to tackle such an important issue as climate change (Termeer et al., 2011). 
However, this multi-actor, multi-sector, and multilevel governance world forms the 
inescapable context for climate adaptation. Furthermore, and contrary to the view that 
the presence of multiple governmental units without a clear hierarchy is chaotic, 
research on polycentric systems has shown that they are very able to manage natural 
resources (Ostrom, 2010). Fragmented networks are also a fertile breeding ground for 
innovations and empowerment, and can provide the governance capacity to enable 
climate adaptation (Huitema et al., 2011; Ostrom, 2010). Whereas fragmentation may thus 
increase the innovativeness and adaptive capacity of the system, too much (conflicting) 
fragmentation can result in bad performances (Biermann et al., 2009). Ostrom (2010, p. 25) 
therefore emphasizes that scholars need to analyze “how polycentric institutions help or 
hinder the innovativeness, learning, adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of 
participants, and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes 
at multiple scales.”
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Specific Feature Three: Inevitable Uncertainties
Decision making in relation to climate change is knowledge intensive. Without systematic 
observations and advanced mathematical models, awareness of climate change would be 
very limited. At the same time, important uncertainties persist about the nature and scale 
of risks and the effectiveness of solutions (Arvai et al., 2006). For example, the effort 
needed to adapt to a 4°C increase in global mean temperature would be significantly 
greater than that needed to adapt to lower magnitudes of temperature increase (IPCC, 
2014). In addition, controversy is inevitable because the many actors involved bring with 
them a variety of perspectives to make sense of an issue like climate change where the 
stakes are high (Hulme, 2009). Climate change knowledge, because of its complexity and 
uncertainty, has a particular feature: as data and models are gathered and constructed 
mainly at global or, in some cases, at continental or national levels, applying these at the 
level of affected regions requires a huge effort that risks multiplying the uncertainties; 
this can lead to either overreaction or insufficient action. Both the uncertainties and the 
ambiguities ascribed to the climate change issue affect the perceived legitimacy of 
climate science and climate adaptation policy in particularly challenging ways. Scientific 
uncertainty does not necessarily prevent political action, but bad decisions can result 
when scientists or decision makers misunderstand the uncertainty with which they have 
to deal and underestimate the range of policy alternatives (Pielke, 2007).
Specific Feature Four: The Long-Term Horizon
Although many impacts are already visible, in general climate change processes are, from 
a human perspective, very dispersed, slow, and long-term (Dewulf & Termeer, 2015). Long-
term meteorological records and advanced climate models and scenarios are crucial for 
projecting possible future developments. As projections of climate change impacts reach 
further into the future, often decades or centuries ahead, the number of unknowns 
increases (Dessai et al., 2007). These deep uncertainties generate difficult dilemmas. On 
the one hand, it is necessary to anticipate future developments, which are (highly) 
uncertain. On the other hand, there are strong pressures to give priority to economic 
interests in the short term (Sheehan et al., 2008). A further complication is the different 
timeframes of physical, economic, and political processes, which are difficult to align and 
easily result in temporal mismatches (Cumming et al., 2006). Budgets for adaptation 
infrastructures, for example, are dependent on political decision-making cycles, which 
play out in a much shorter term than processes of climate change (Dewulf & Termeer, 
2015). A large number of yearly policy cycles will occur before any climate impacts become 
visible and the effects of adaptation measures can be evaluated (Vink, Dewulf et al., 2013). 
Short-term interventions based on a long-term vision demand a specific and enduring 
commitment by taxpayers, politicians, or residents, and it is thus tempting for politicians 
to postpone difficult or expensive long-term decisions (Termeer et al., 2011). However, 
short-sighted decision making that emphasizes reducing short-term over long-term risks 
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may potentially increase vulnerability and therefore the costs associated with future 
adaption efforts (IPCC, 2014; Berrang-Ford et al., 2011). In the case of adaptation tipping 
points, postponements of decisions can become very expensive and even disastrous 
(Huntington et al., 2012). Despite these risks, Huitema et al. (2016) conclude that many 
governance actors take a wait-and-see approach to climate adaptation issues.
Towards Design Principles for Governance 
Arrangements
Having described the general and specific features of the governance of adaptation to 
climate change, this section turns to the question of the design of governance 
arrangements. First it defines the concepts of design, governing, and governance 
arrangements. It presents seven elements, that are crucial for designing governance 
arrangements. For each of these elements, this section summarizes the literature and 
suggests some tentative design principles.
Designing governance arrangements is a sensitive issue. This chapter follows Huitema et 
al. (2016), who nuance the concept of willful design by emphasizing that governance 
arrangements are often the emergent outcomes of complex political processes, rather 
than the result of a rational design, implicitly made by governance actors. Whereas 
Huitema et al. (2016) limit their analysis to important choices and their consequences, this 
chapter is seeking to further the discussion by suggesting tentative design principles.
Governing refers to “all those interactions and activities of social, political[,] and 
administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control[,] or 
manage (sectors or facets of) societies” and governance refers to “the patterns that 
emerge from governing activities” (Kooiman, 1993, p. 2). More particularly, this chapter 
follows Dupuis and Biesbroek (2013, p. 1480), who define adaptation governance as
the process leading to the production of outputs in forms of activities and 
decisions taken by purposeful public and private actors at different administrative 
levels and in different sectors, which deals intentionally with climate change 
impacts, and whose outcomes attempt to substantially impact actor groups, 
sectors, or geographical areas that are vulnerable to climate change.
A governance arrangement is the ensemble of rules, processes, and instruments that 
structure these processes to realize collective goals for climate adaptation (Termeer et 
al., 2011).
A series of basic issues have to be addressed in designing climate adaptation governance 
arrangements: the framing of the problem, the levels of action, the timing of the policies, 
the alignment across sectoral boundaries, the selection of policy instruments, the 
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organization of the science-policy interface, and the most appropriate form of leadership 
(Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2016; Termeer et al., 2011).
Element One: Framing the Problem
The first element relates to which problems to address and how to frame them. This issue 
addresses the specific problem feature of uncertainties and contested knowledge, as 
described in section two. Rather than being a single problem, climate change adaptation 
poses a confusing set of interrelated problems, resulting in competing framings of the 
issue (Dewulf, 2013; Hulme, 2009). The backgrounds of the different actors cause them to 
differ in their overall causal conception of climate change, their assessment of its 
seriousness and urgency, its risks and impacts at the geographical and political level 
concerned, the burdens and benefits it may cause, and the normative and political 
questions of how to legitimately pool or allocate these risks, burdens, and benefits. Actors 
often engage in struggles to frame climate adaptation as problems that suit their pre-
existing political interests or policy competences (Jordan et al., 2010). This process of 
framing involves an interplay between puzzling—to develop plausible storylines and 
solutions—and powering—to decide whose frames are most relevant (Hoppe, 2010; Vink, 
Dewulf et al., 2013).
Climate adaptation is framed in various different ways, such as a risk minimization 
problem, a capacity-building problem, a way to take advantage of new climatic 
conditions, and an issue of equity and justice (Massey et al., 2015; Huitema et al., 2016). A 
good frame helps to focus, but also to activate the right people, to prevent exclusion, and 
to overcome controversies. Emphasizing the enormous challenges of climate change can 
overwhelm people and may result in actors drawing back and reverting to defensive 
strategies (see Rittel & Webber, 1973; Vink, 2015). The adoption of a climate-centered angle 
in the problem framing leads to greater chances of attention and commitment problems 
in the policy cycle (Dupuis & Knoepfel, 2013). To prevent this risk of failure, the Dutch 
Delta Program, for example, successfully reframed the issue of climate-proofing the 
Netherlands as one of economic prosperity in relation to flood safety, omitting the term 
climate change from their press release altogether (Vink, Boezeman et al., 2013). This 
frame was able to attract and activate both left- and right-wing policymakers.
In general, governance arrangements that organize room for reflexivity are better able to 
appreciate and deal with multiple frames and to avoid the risk of tunnel vision and 
intractable controversies between powerful players (Termeer, Dewulf, Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen et al., 2016). It is preferable not to settle on a fixed problem definition, because 
allowing for ambiguity may encourage a variety of actors to join in. The absence of a 
definition of adaptation and vulnerability in the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) agreements, for example, resulted in more parties participating 
(Moore, 2012). Also, the consensus frame in the EU adaptation policies leaves member 
states lots of room to develop their national strategies in the way they deem necessary 
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(Keessen, 2014; Termeer, Dewulf, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2016). However, too much 
abstract, ambiguously understood, technical depoliticized framing may result in a 
bystander effect (Vink, 2015).
Element Two: The Levels of Action
The second element of governance arrangements involves the choice of level(s) at which 
to act. The archetypical issue is finding the right fit between the scale of a problem and 
the scale at which it is governed (Cash et al., 2003). Given the context of a fragmented 
polycentric system however, addressing cross-level issues and enhancing a vertical 
interplay between different levels of governance is also crucial (Young, 2002).
Whereas climate mitigation puts the global and the national level center stage, climate 
adaptation is a typical multilevel governance challenge that needs connections across 
scales (Adger, 2001). The variety of local conditions and impacts points towards a prime 
role for local authorities and regions in climate change adaptation, but the scale of 
impacts and mutual interdependencies require national or international responses as well 
(Jordan et al., 2010). Because many adaptation policies are embedded in international 
agreements of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the European 
Union’s adaptation strategy, in practice the key choices left for parties and member states 
are about the roles of national, regional, and local governments (Massey et al., 2015). 
Obviously, the choice of level(s) at which to act has far-reaching consequences in terms of 
responsibilities and inclusions or exclusions of actors, and thus power positions (Van 
Lieshout et al., 2014).
In order to avoid a mismatch between the scale of a problem and the scale at which it is 
governed, a lot of attention has to be given to the search for an optimal level (Cash et al., 
2006). However, an optimal fit from a technical point of view often neglects: the formal and 
political reality of decision procedures; the lack of support from uninvolved levels or from 
levels that become involved too late; or the importance of scale dynamics (Cash et al., 
2006; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Young, 2002). Moreover, the question of whether certain 
adaptation issues are a local, regional, or international problem is not pre-given and the 
result of framing, including the inherent power play (Van Lieshout et al., 2014). Matching 
the scale of the problem with the scale of governance thus requires sensitivity to scale 
dynamics and scale frames (Dewulf & Termeer, 2015).
The multilevel approach starts from the idea that governance actions may be required at 
several levels simultaneously instead of focusing on “the one right level” (Verkerk et al., 
2015). Governance actors must operate at multiple levels in order to capture variations in 
both the impacts of climate adaptation as policy outcomes and externalities (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2003). The main choice addresses the issue of interplay between levels (Young, 
2002). For example, a climate adaptation strategy developed at a local level may be less 
effective if it neglects or even hinders adaptation strategies at other levels (Moss & 
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Newig, 2010). Various structures and processes, or bridging mechanisms, are suggested to 
manage collaboration and coordination across levels (Gilissen et al., 2016; Isett et al., 2011; 
Provan et al., 2007). Synchronization—also known as mutual adjustment in the literature 
on polycentric governance—goes beyond orchestrated interplay and starts from the often 
assumed self-organizing quality of governance processes (Jaworski, 1996). Synchronization 
arises when actors at different levels give meaning to their processes in relation to the 
“whole” governance context and, based upon that, position their actions in such a way 
that they attune to other actions and strengthen one another (Verkerk et al., 2015; Van 
Buuren et al., 2010; Teisman & Edelenbos, 2011). Boundary actors are crucial in these 
synchronization processes, as well as specific interventions at junctures when specific 
issues hinder synergy (Verkerk et al., 2015).
Element Three: The Timing of Policies
The third element involves the choice of when and in what sequence to act. In spite of 
inherent long-term uncertainties, decisions about adaptation strategies need to be taken 
or prepared now (Burton et al., 2007). An important choice, therefore, is whether to act in 
a more precautionary manner or wait for more scientific evidence about the impacts of 
climate change or the projected harm (Driessen & van Rijswick, 2011; Jordan et al., 2010). 
Whereas too late responses may cause irrecoverable problems, too early responses risk 
lock-ins (the impossibility of moving away from a particular adaptation strategy that 
proves to be maladaptive) or regrets (the political and financial costs of having to move to 
another policy option; Dewulf & Termeer, 2015).
To prevent lock-ins or regrets, many scholars suggest robustness and flexibility as design 
principles to enhance resilience (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Olsson et al., 2014). 
Robust measures can be defined as those interventions that maintain performance under 
a different range of plausible future scenarios. This does not mean that measures are 
developed assuming the most likely or the worst-case scenario, but that they do account 
for uncertainties by continuing to rely on multiple possible future scenarios. Strategies 
are flexible if it is possible to intensify or adjust measures when needed and thus can be 
adapted to new developments or knowledge over time. If deliberate attention is paid to 
robustness and flexibility, the long-term perspective can be brought into short-term 
decision making (Dewulf & Termeer, 2015).
Forward-looking policymaking may also result in a deliberate decision to postpone 
measures and keep options open. Although a wise strategy in certain circumstances, it 
involves the political risk of losing momentum. If crises like flooding or intensive periods 
of drought elevate climate adaptation to the top of the media agenda, the pressure 
increases on politics to take action (True et al., 2007). However, this momentum does not 
last forever, and opportunities to develop new policies must be cherished before this 
window of opportunity closes. In “normal” times, it is tempting for politicians to postpone 
difficult or expensive long-term decisions. The Dutch Delta Fund is an interesting 
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example of how to overcome this dilemma (Dewulf & Termeer, 2015; Vink, 2015). At a time 
when climate adaptation was high on the political agenda, the Dutch government 
installed an independent Delta Fund. This fund is a solid foundation with a fixed annual 
budget up to 2028 that secures sufficient financial resources to be able to invest in 
projects for climate-proofing the Netherlands.
Element Four: The Alignment Across Sectoral Boundaries
The fourth element involves alignment across sectoral boundaries. This element 
addresses the challenge that the governance systems to deal with the consequences of 
climate change are highly fragmented, as described in section two. Many adaptation 
measures need to be addressed and implemented in policy sectors that are not primarily 
driven by climate adaptation concerns and interests, such as water management, 
environmental management, nature conservation, health, agriculture, or housing. 
Adaptation to climate change is a typical cross-cutting policy issue. It is an ongoing 
debate whether it is more effective to incorporate adaptation measures within existing 
policy domains and strategies, or whether a separate policy domain of climate adaptation 
is necessary (Kok & de Coninck, 2007; Massey & Huitema, 2013). Uittenbroek (2014) suggests 
that positioning adaptation as a separate domain is useful for organizing attention and 
support, whereas incorporating, integrating, or mainstreaming adaptation measures 
within existing policy sectors is effective in the stages of decision making, 
implementation, and enforcement. The European Union started by mainstreaming 
adaptation in other policy fields, and specific legislation for climate adaptation may be 
developed if the mainstreaming approach does not appear to be successful. A related 
question is whether adaptation programs can best be organized as bypasses of existing 
bureaucracies or whether they have to be structurally anchored and embedded within 
existing sectors. Plausible arguments can be made for either of these.
In the case of incorporation, the challenge is to develop arrangements that bring actors, 
issues, and sectors together to realize creative climate adaptation options that do justice 
to different values, interests, and motives (May et al., 2006). Here, the main choice is often 
presented as between mandatory mainstreaming or more bottom-up collaboration 
(Huitema et al., 2016). It is important to note that the effects of fragmentation, especially 
the lack of inter-policy connections, are not limited to policymaking processes about 
climate adaption strategies, but also strongly affect implementation practices (Dupuis & 
Knoepfel, 2013). The realization of many climate adaptation strategies will, for example, 
lead to land-use claims, which can be accommodated more easily if they are integrated 
with existing land use or linked to other land-use claims. For instance, the development of 
special areas for water retention in cities is more easily achieved when those areas are 
designed as multi-functional city squares that creatively integrate water retention 
strategies with landscaping and more recreational facilities (Termeer et al., 2011). 
Advanced modes of process management are required to organize cross-boundary 
interactions to develop multi-functional plans in pillared governance systems. 
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Collaborative advantage is very time- and resource-intensive, and the advice for 
practitioners is to strive for this only when the goals are well worth it (Huxham & Vangen,
2004; Van Broekhoven et al., 2015). Moreover, too much emphasis on connecting climate 
adaptation to other policy agendas can harm its legitimacy (Van Buuren et al., 2014).
Candel and Biesbroek (2016) suggest that policy integration is not a fixed outcome but a 
dynamic process. The level of integration can vary in terms of: the broadness of the 
problem frames, the range of policy sectors involved, the density of boundary-spanning 
interactions, the coherence of policy goals, the mutual consistency of policy instruments, 
the presence of overarching ambitions, and the scope of coordination instruments 
(Candel & Biesbroek, 2016). The value of lower degrees of integration should not be 
underestimated, as these may sometimes be the most feasible or appropriate for the 
cross-cutting climate adaptation problem (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Gilissen et al., 2016). 
Van Broekhoven et al. (2015) also emphasized that policymakers must not try to connect 
everything to everything. In addition to spanning boundaries, it is also important to 
cherish boundaries in terms of responsibility and accountability. Clear demarcations can 
help to create a sense of order that facilitates decision making and implementation. A 
clear allocation of responsibilities helps to get adaptation planning and action off the 
ground (Mees, 2016).
Element Five: The Selection of Policy Instruments
The fifth element involves the selection of policy instruments to influence the behavior of 
citizens or firms in a certain direction or to increase the adaptive capacity of society. 
Jordan et al. (2010) identify possible packages: hierarchical governance imposing a set of 
enforceable norms through the instrument of regulation, market-based governance 
allowing for the dissemination of norms via economic instruments, or relying on network-
based modes in which communications and trust-based incentives play a more important 
role.
In general, a tailor-made mix of policy instruments, attuned to the specific context of a 
particular climate adaptation issue, is most appropriate (Howlett & Rayner, 2007). Modes 
of climate adaptation governance tend to vary across policy stages, so that different 
modes coexist for a particular adaptation issue/measure (Mees et al., 2014). A combination 
that is often found is hierarchical steering in the early stages and market or network 
steering in the implementation stages. There are, however, also many adaptation policies 
that just start with informal network approaches and end up as formal laws. Mees et al.’s 
(2014) research also highlights the importance of combining policy instruments in climate 
adaptation to compensate for one another’s weaknesses and to serve different target 
groups. An example of an effective combination is the use of a regulatory instrument 
(technical requirement) with an economic instrument (tax reduction). In Basel and 
Stuttgart, for example, such a combination has proved to induce massive green roof 
installations (Mees et al., 2013; Mees, 2016). Scholars must not forget that the choice of 
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policy instruments is also rooted in ideological debates (Keessen et al., 2013). Despite the 
proven effectiveness of such combinations, liberal parties, for example, are more willing 
to apply economic instruments than issue new regulations.
Contractual agreements are an interesting alternative policy instrument. They offer a 
nice balance between voluntariness and regulation: partners are free to enter, but once 
they enter they are bound by the agreed rules within the agreement (Mees et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, they are very able to take account of the dynamic social complexity 
(multitude of public and private actors with different interests and values) and spatial 
diversity (climate impacts differ depending on varying levels of vulnerability) that 
characterize many local adaptation issues. Specific attention needs to be given to legal 
instruments that provide enough flexibility for an adaptive approach (Keessen et al., 2013).
An underlying dilemma involves the allocation of public and private responsibilities 
(Driessen & van Rijswick, 2011; Mees et al., 2013). Is adaptation typically a public 
responsibility of the state or a private responsibility that should be left partially or 
entirely to citizens? In general, a hierarchical arrangement with a large role for public 
authorities seems to be necessary in the early stages, in order to start the policymaking 
process (Mees, 2016). However, if firms and citizens expect the government to take care of 
them, they will not develop the preparedness or the learning capacity needed for times of 
crisis (Gupta et al., 2010). This moral-hazard dilemma challenges the development of 
instruments whereby private parties are encouraged to play a role in developing 
adaptation strategies (Termeer et al., 2011).
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Element Six: The Organization of the Science-Policy Interface
The sixth element involves the organization of the interface between science and policy. 
Decision making in relation to climate change is knowledge intensive. However, the 
science underpinning climate problems and adaptation strategies has increasingly 
become contested, in particular because opponents use scientific arguments too, 
interpret uncertainties differently, or exploit scientific disagreements (Boezeman et al., 
2013). Pielke et al. (2007) even claim that society’s ultimate success in responding to, and 
preparing for, climate change in the face of ongoing uncertainty depends on the renewed 
relation between climate scientists and policymakers.
The recognition is growing that the relation between science and policy is much more 
complex than originally assumed (Boezeman et al., 2013). The traditional role of science of 
“speaking truth to power” is being transformed into an argumentative policy analysis as 
“making sense together” (Hoppe, 2010). Cash et al. (2003) suggest that scientific advice is 
likely to be effective if relevant stakeholders perceive the knowledge as credible—
meaning scientifically adequate, salient—meaning relevant and timely for decision 
makers, and legitimate—meaning acceptable to different stakeholders. Boundary 
organizations, joint fact-finding, and co-production are important notions for relating 
science and policy. Boundary organizations exist at the frontier of the two relatively 
different social worlds of politics and science, with definite lines of accountability to each. 
They involve actors from both sides and provide the opportunity for the creation of 
models or maps that help both parties to make sense of the situation (Guston, 2000). 
Boundary organizations can organize processes of joint fact-finding in which stakeholders 
work together to collectively identify critical scientific questions, scope their needs, 
commission studies from experts that all parties support and trust, and collectively 
receive and evaluate the results (Karl et al., 2007). They can also organize processes of co-
production by facilitating the collaboration between science and policy and the creation 
of a combined scientific and social order (Jasanoff, 2004).
These forms of close collaboration can help to bridge the gap between policymakers and 
scientists, but also brings the danger of collusion; when there is not enough room for 
reflection, a climate of non-confrontation arises (Gray & Schruijer, 2010). In the context of 
transformative change in particular, it may limit a critical appraisal of science itself 
(Kates et al., 2012; Pelling et al., 2014). A related risk is the lack of transparency vis-à-vis the 
outside world. As soon as actors become issue advocates without being explicit about it, 
the credibility and legitimacy of scientists and their knowledge become compromised 
(Hegger & Dieperink, 2014). Hence, a boundary organization needs to be clear about its 
roles, and others need to be explicit about their expectations of the organization (Hegger 
& Dieperink, 2014). Both the politicization of science and the scientization of politics must 
be avoided (Guston, 2000).
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Element Seven: The Appropriate Forms of Leadership
The final element involves the choice of leadership. Government officials, elected 
politicians, and private actors involved in practices of climate adaptation all face the 
challenge of enhancing coordination and cooperation across different problem frames, 
levels, sectors, time horizons, science-policy interfaces, and public-private spheres. The 
leadership literature focuses largely on the role of positional leaders; these are 
individuals who have a formal responsibility to lead an organization or group (Osborn & 
Hunt, 2007). Because fragmented systems lack leaders with formal control over all 
resources needed to implement adaptation measures, governance arrangements for 
climate adaptation should go beyond traditional, hierarchical conceptions of leadership. 
Allen et al. (1998) pointed to the specific features of what they termed sustainability 
leadership. Fragmented systems challenge leadership to take a leading role in connecting 
actors, issues, sectors, and scale levels to realize innovative climate adaptation options 
that accommodate different values, interests, and motives (Olsson et al., 2014). All that can 
never be done by a single leader (Chrislip, 2002).
More recent leadership research points to complexity leadership; this is in particular 
relevant for uncertain fragmented governance systems that require the capacity to adapt 
flexibly to uncertain future developments (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Osborn & Hunt, 2007). 
Scholars distinguish various leadership dynamics that are not connected to formal 
positions or fixed persons, and simultaneously occur at all levels of the governance 
system. Inspired by complexity leadership theory, Meijerink and Stiller (2013) distinguish 
between four functions of leadership, crucial for adaptation governance: administrative, 
adaptive, connective, and enabling. Administrative leadership aims to create order within 
an organization, for example by dividing tasks, allocating budgets, and monitoring task 
performance, and can be performed by positional leaders only. Adaptive leadership is 
about the development of new ideas and practices; this is often the result of group 
dynamics within an organization. Connective leadership aims to connect different levels 
of government, policy sectors, and public and private parties. Enabling leadership, which 
can be performed by both positional and non-positional leaders, aims to create the 
necessary conditions for innovation. Parties may demonstrate enabling leadership by 
convening parties, stimulating interactions, leaving room for parties to deviate from 
existing organizational routines, and managing the entanglement between informal and 
formal leadership networks.
In addition to administrative leadership, connective, enabling, and adaptive leadership is 
crucial for the development and implementation of new adaptation concepts (Meijerink & 
Stiller, 2013). One person may contribute to different leadership functions. Besides 
positional leaders, active citizens, representatives of NGOs, and entrepreneurial 
university researchers may fulfill important leadership functions (Meijerink & Stiller, 
2013). Increased attention is paid to the role of local and regional leaders (Hjerpe & 
Storbjörk, 2016). Leadership challenges in bottom-up-initiated project initiatives are 
Governance Arrangements for the Adaptation to Climate Change
Page 17 of 31
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CLIMATE SCIENCE (climatescience.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford 
University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see 
applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen; date: 08 November 2017
different from leadership challenges in government-led adaptation projects (Meijerink et 
al., 2015). Governmental leaders, for example, who initiate new adaptation projects may 
have good access to decision-making arenas but may face problems in mobilizing societal 
actors. On the other hand, active citizens or researchers are able to build new networks 
and generate innovative solutions to adaptation issues but face major challenges in 
integrating their newly developed ideas into formal policies (Chrislip, 2002). These parties 
sometimes invest a lot of time, energy, and resources in initiating new practices of 
climate change adaptation. Positional leaders may help such bottom-up initiatives by 
expressing support, arranging financial resources, giving the necessary room for 
innovation, or helping to translate newly developed ideas into formal policies (Stiller & 
Meijerink, 2016).
Conclusions
Section three has synthesized the scientific literature on climate adaptation governance 
into seven elements for governance arrangements. Together, these seven elements result 
in a governance arrangement to deal with the general and specific features of adaptation 
to climate change. Table 1 summarizes the main challenges for each element and the 
related design principles. Furthermore, this section critically discusses the application of 
the suggested design principles. It argues that thinking about governance arrangements 
for adaptation to climate change implies thinking about these seven elements and making 
deliberate, context- and time-specific choices, constrained and/or enabled by existing 
institutions.
Table 1: Summary of Challenges and Design Principles
Element of the 
Governance 
Arrangement
Main Challenges Design Principles
The framing of the 
problem





Awareness of puzzling and 
powering
Leave room for reflexivity
Cherish ambiguity
Avoid frames that are too 
overwhelming, too 
abstract, too one-
dimensional, or too 
depoliticized
The level(s) at 
which to act
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Organizing a fit between 
the scale of a problem and 
the scale at which it is 
governed
Vertical interplay between 
different levels
Sensitivity to the dynamics 
of scales and scale frames






The timing of the 
policies
Deciding when to wait and 
when to act
Including long-term 
projections in short-term 
decisions







Deciding what to organize 
in separated climate 
adaptation programs and 
what to incorporate in 
sectors
Organizing linkages and 
coherence between climate 
adaptation and sectoral 
policies
Awareness of various 








Clear demarcation of 
sectoral boundaries and 
allocation of 
responsibilities
The selection of 
policy instruments
Developing packages of 
policy instruments (legal, 
economic, communicative) 
and governance modes 
(hierarchy, market, 
network)
Allocation of public and 
private responsibilities
Awareness of ideological 
debates regarding these 
selections
Stacking of modes of 
governance
Smart mixes of policy 
instruments
Activating citizen
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Organizing a renewed 
relation between climate 
scientists and policymakers
Stakeholders must 
perceive knowledge as 
credible, salient, and 
legitimate
Avoiding the politicization 









while nobody has formal 
control over all resources 
needed
Connecting actors, issues, 
sectors, scale levels
Accommodating different 




Multiple leaders, varying 
from elected politicians to 
active citizens
Ensuring administrative, 
connective, adaptive, and 
enabling leadership 
functions
Applying this list of design principles requires modesty. It especially requires sensitivity 
to dilemmas, trade-offs, and changing conditions. As noted, choices of arrangements 
cannot be reduced to technocratic managerial decisions. Mostly, they are not the result of 
purposive and organized decision processes, but of emerging patterns and behaviors 
(Huitema et al., 2016). Furthermore, these choices are always embedded within the formal 
and informal rules of existing institutions. New governance arrangements are almost 
always constrained by previous choices that have become institutionalized (Howlett & 
Rayner, 2007). Moreover, although there certainly are some generalities in how countries 
respond to climate risks, the administrative traditions of states still shape the 
particularities (Vink et al., 2015). It is for example interesting to analyze to what extent this 
list is applicable to adaptation in developing countries, that are characterized by different 
governance systems and limited resources.
Normative principles are an important element of these institutions. Besides the 
principles deducible from the UNFCCC and its implementation in domestic law, most 
states rely on legal principles of a more general kind, but which are also relevant for 
climate adaptation (Driessen & van Rijswick, 2011). Choices regarding the various 
elements of the governance arrangements implicitly or explicitly touch upon a whole 
range of normative principles, such as the user-pays or polluter-pays principle, the non-
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shift principle, the precautionary principle, the right to be compensated when one suffers 
more than others from governmental measures, and the subsidiarity principle (Driessen 
& van Rijswick, 2011). Judgments on these issues are intimately tied to considerations of 
fairness, solidarity, proportionality, and legitimacy. These normative principles have been 
given limited attention, but there is a need to address and reconcile tensions between 
normative principles in order to develop policies that are perceived as fair (Keessen et al.,
2013).
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